A field guide to AI positions

Longtermism

Dated sources are over 18 months old; other dates are unknown.

Publication dates and source age

Sources counted: 3

Newest dated source: 2022-08-15

Assessed at this edition's evidence cutoff: 2026-09-15. 18-month boundary: 2025-03-15.

Some publication dates are unknown; the newest dated source may not be the newest source overall.

Publication age does not tell us whether a claim is still valid. Reading an old source again does not make its publication date newer. An update date does not establish that the passage we used was updated.

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In plain language

The view that protecting future generations deserves much more attention. Critics dispute predictions about distant effects and how far possible future benefits should outweigh present needs. [1] [2] [3]

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Limits & distinctions

Concern for future generations does not require agreement with every longtermist priority. MacAskill argues that preventing extinction can have predictable lasting benefits. Kieran Setiya challenges the ethical weight given to possible future populations over present suffering. Cremer and Kemp question how some existential-risk frameworks handle uncertainty and competing values. None of these arguments fixes one AI timeline or policy. [1] [2] [3]

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A fuller explanation

A view that gives substantial moral importance to future people and to the lasting effects of today’s choices. William MacAskill argues that future people matter, could be numerous and can be helped or harmed by what we do now. How strongly those considerations should determine present priorities is disputed. [1] [2]

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How it relates to the map

Can motivate catastrophic-risk work, but does not fix a development speed or a particular AI forecast. [1]

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Sources and what we read

  1. 1. Longtermism

    Publication dates and source age

    Sources counted: 1

    Publication dates are unavailable.

    Assessed at this edition's evidence cutoff: 2026-09-15. 18-month boundary: 2025-03-15.

    Some publication dates are unknown; the newest dated source may not be the newest source overall.

    Publication age does not tell us whether a claim is still valid. Reading an old source again does not make its publication date newer. An update date does not establish that the passage we used was updated.

    An advocate's account of the moral importance of future people. The page is undated; the book's publication date is not used as the page date.

  2. 2. The New Moral Mathematics

    Source is over 18 months old.

    Publication dates and source age

    Sources counted: 1

    Newest dated source: 2022-08-15

    Assessed at this edition's evidence cutoff: 2026-09-15. 18-month boundary: 2025-03-15.

    Publication age does not tell us whether a claim is still valid. Reading an old source again does not make its publication date newer. An update date does not establish that the passage we used was updated.

    Read Setiya’s review sections on population ethics and the priority given to future survival over present suffering. The entry attributes his ethical criticism and does not adopt the article’s empirical forecasts.

  3. 3. Democratising Risk: In Search of a Methodology to Study Existential Risk

    Source is over 18 months old.

    Publication dates and source age

    Sources counted: 1

    Newest dated source: 2021-12-27

    Assessed at this edition's evidence cutoff: 2026-09-15. 18-month boundary: 2025-03-15.

    Publication age does not tell us whether a claim is still valid. Reading an old source again does not make its publication date newer. An update date does not establish that the passage we used was updated.

    Read the abstract and submission history. The authors argue for clearer definitions, plural values and better risk methods. Their criticism of one influential framework is not a finding that all catastrophe research is invalid.

Edition and machine-readable evidence

Content version 0.20.0. Evidence cutoff 2026-09-15; this does not mean every source was read on that day.

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